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Guest Workers:
New Solution or New Problem?
Philip Martint
The world's population in 2006 was 6.555 billion.1 Globally,
the average woman has 2.7 children, but fertility rates vary from
a high of 7.9 children per woman in Niger to a low of 1.3 in Euro-
pean countries such as Spain and Russia. 2 Virtually all of the
annual 79 million person increase in global population is in de-
veloping countries. 3
About 47 percent of the world's population, and half of the
population in most countries, is in the labor force. 4 This makes
the global labor force 3.1 billion.5 The United States, which has
302 million residents in 2007, has 153 million workers in the la-
bor force, 6 or 51 percent of the population.7 The distributions of
the world's workers and the world's economic output, however,
are strikingly different. About 84 percent of the world's workers
are in low and middle-income countries, while 80 percent of the
world's $40 trillion Gross National Income ("GNI") accrued to the
high-income countries8 with 16 percent of the world's workers in
2005.9
t Philip Martin is Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the Univer-
sity of California-Davis and chair of the University of California's Comparative Immigra-
tion and Integration Program.
1 Population Reference Bureau, 2006 World Population Data Sheet 5 (2006), avail-
able at <http://www.prb.org/pdf06/06WorldDataSheet.pdf> (last visited on Feb 6, 2007).
2 Id at 5, 10.
3 Id at 5.
4 See World Bank, 2006 World Development Indicators 22, 52, available online at
<http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/index2.htm> (last visited July 16, 2007).
5 International Labour Organization Bureau of Statistics, LABORSTA Database of
Labour Statistics (2006), available at <http:/laborsta.ilo.org/cgi-bin/brokerv8.exe> (last
visited July 16, 2007).
6 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, available at <http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nrO.htm> (last visited July 16, 2007).
7 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Finder, available at <http://factfinder.census.gov/
servlet/SAFFPopulation?_submenuId=population0&sse=on> (last visited July 16, 2007)
(declaring the U.S. population in 2006 was 299,398,484).
8 The twenty-seven high-income countries include most Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD") countries as well as oil exporters Kuwait, Saudi
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The gap in average per-capita incomes between high-income
and low- and middle-income countries is large. In 2004, average
global per capita GNI was $6,329, and ranged from an average
$32,112 in high-income countries to $1,502 in low- and middle-
income countries, a 21-1 difference. 10 This wage gap between
high and low-income countries, which has not changed in the
past quarter century, encourages people-especially the young-
to cross national borders in search of higher wages and more
economic opportunities.
Migration is an age-old response to differences in economic
opportunity, security, and other factors, but international migra-
tion over regulated national borders is relatively recent. There
were 43 generally recognized countries in the year 1900,11 versus
almost 200 today. 12 The number of international migrants, 191
million in 2005,13 has doubled in the past two decades in four
distinct flows. Some sixty-two million migrants have moved from
a developing to a developed country ("south to north"), sixty-one
million from a developing country to another developing country
("south to south"), fifty-three million from a developed country to
another developed country ("north to north"), and fourteen mil-
lion from a developed country to a developing country ("north to
south"). 14
Arabia, UAE, Israel, Korea, and Singapore.
9 World Bank, 2006 World Development Indicators at 22, 52 (cited in note 4). The
World Bank puts the global labor force at slightly less than 3 billion in 2004, including
almost 2.5 billion in low- and middle-income countries and approximately 490 million in
28 high-income countries. The International Labor Organization (ILO") puts the eco-
nomically active population of persons 15 to 64 at 3.1 billion in 2004. ILO Bureau of Sta-
tistics, LABORSTA Database of Labour Statistics (cited in note 5). The World Bank put
GNI at $40.281 trillion, including $32.245 trillion or 80 percent in high-income countries.
See World Bank, 2006 World Development Indicators at 22 (cited in note 4). For purchas-
ing power parity ("PPP"), which is GNI adjusted for the lower cost of living in low and
middle-income countries, world GNI was $56.289 trillion, including 55 percent in the
high-income countries. Id.
10 World Bank, 2006 World Development Indicators at 22 (cited in note 4). At PPP,
average per capita GNI was $8,844, with $31,009 in high-income countries and $4,726 in
low and middle-income countries, a 6.6 to 1 difference. Id.
11 Philip L. Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping
America, 61 Population Reference Bureau (December 2006) (describing the history of
immigration patterns in the U.S.).
12 There were 43 generally recognized nation-states in 1900 and 193 independent
states in 2007. See Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, available at <https://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/xx.html> (last updated June 14, 2007).
13 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on International Migration 12
(May 18, 2006), available at <http://www.old.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/OFFICIALTXT/EN/
A_60_871_EN.pdf> (last visited Apr 10, 2007).
14 Id. These are estimates of the total number of migrants present in a particular
area in 2005, meaning that migrants may have arrived recently or long ago. Personal
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Half of these migrants are in the labor force of the destina-
tion area, making the sixty million migrant workers in high-
income countries an average 12 percent of their labor forces.15
The thirty-one million migrant workers from developing coun-
tries in developed countries (half of sixty-two million) are differ-
ent from the workers they join abroad and those left behind at
home. Globally, 40 percent of the world's workers are employed
in agriculture, 20 percent in industry and construction, and 40
percent in services, 16 and developing country migrants are drawn
from societies that have this 40-20-40 distribution of workers.
The industrial countries to which migrants move have about 3
percent of their workers employed in agriculture, 25 percent in
industry, and 72 percent in services. 17
Migrant workers from developing countries who are in in-
dustrial countries have a labor force distribution unlike that of
sending or receiving countries. About 10 percent are employed in
agriculture, 40 percent in industry and construction, and 50 per-
cent in services, i8 reflecting a tendency of three types of employ-
ers in industrial countries to request migrant workers: (1) those
in sunset industries such as agriculture and light manufacturing
such as sewing; (2) those in industries that produce products that
are difficult to trade over national borders, such as construction;
and (3) a wide range of services that are delivered on site, from
janitorial to health care services. 19
Migrant workers from developing countries in industrial
countries also have personal characteristics that are different
from the average populations of sending and receiving countries.
The best single determinant of individual earnings in industrial
countries is years of education. 20 In most developing countries,
communication, UN Population Division.
15 See International Labour Office, Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the
Global Economy (2004).
16 ILO Bureau of Statistics, LABORSTA Database of Labour Statistics (cited in note
5).
17 Consider Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD in
Figures (2005), available at <http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,2340,en_2649_201185
2345918ii1i ,00.html> (last visited Feb 10, 2007).
18 OECD, International Migration Outlook 57 (2006), available at <http:I
www.oecd.org/document/6/0,2340,en_2649_33931_367704381iiii,00.html> (last vis-
ited Feb 10, 2007).
19 Id.
20
[T]he accumulation of a tremendous amount of circumstantial evidence testify-
ing to the economic importance of human capital, especially of education.
Probably the most impressive piece of evidence is that more highly educated
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the distribution of adults by years of education has a pyramid
shape, with a few well-educated persons on top and most workers
at the bottom, usually having less than a secondary school cer-
tificate or high school diploma.21
Native-born adults in high-income countries have a diamond
shape when arrayed by years of education. 22 About 25 percent
have a college degree, 60 percent have a secondary school certifi-
cate, and 15 percent have less than a secondary certificate or
high-school diploma.23 Migrants from developing countries in
industrial countries are different from adults at home and
abroad, forming more of an hourglass or barbell shape when ar-
rayed by years of education. 24 Some 35 to 40 percent have a col-
lege degree, 25 percent a secondary school certificate, and 35
percent less than a high-school diploma.25 International migra-
tion from developing to industrial countries thus takes persons
from the top and bottom of a pyramid distribution and adds them
to the top and bottom of a diamond-shaped distribution.
The Global Commission on International Migration
("GCIM"), the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on
Trade in Services ("GATS") Mode 4 negotiations, and voices in
both developing and industrial countries are calling for more
workers to cross national borders to generate so-called win-win-
win outcomes.26 Under this scenario, migrants win by earning
and skilled persons almost always tend to earn more than others. This is true of
developed countries as different as the United States and the [then] Soviet Un-
ion, or underdeveloped countries as different as India and Cuba, and of the
United States one hundred years ago as well as today.
Gary Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Refer-
ence to Education 12 (Chicago 1993).





25 Martin and Midgley, Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America at 24 (cited in
note 11).
26 Joint IOM/World Bank[WTO Seminar, Managing the movement of People: what
can be learned for Mode 4 of the GATS?, Geneva, 4-5 October 2004, program presentation
schedule available at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/sem-oct04_e/sem_
oct04_e.htm> (last visited Apr 12, 2007) (discussing issues of GATS Mode 4 implementa-
tion); World Trade Organization, Workshop on Domestic Regulation, 29-30 March 2004,
available at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv e/workshop-march04-e/workshop
_march04 e.htm> (last visited Apr 12, 2007) (stating purpose of the workshop was to
"bring together and inform regulators, trade negotiators, and other relevant officials");
Joint WTO-World Bank Symposium, Movement of natural persons (mode 4) under the
GATS, Geneva, 11-12 April 2002, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
serv e/symp-mov naturperso april02_e.htm> (last visited Apr 12, 2007) (providing "a
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higher wages, receiving countries win with additional workers
who expand employment and economic output, and sending
countries win via remittances and the return of workers who
gained skills abroad.27 Economic theory and experience confirm
that moving workers from developing to developed countries
benefits migrants, who often take enormous risks to cross bor-
ders. Moving workers from lower to higher wage areas also cre-
ates small net economic benefits in receiving countries, largely
because the migrants hold down wages and prices.28 For the
United States in the mid-1990s, a National Research Council
report estimated the net economic benefits of immigration to be
between $1 billion and $10 billion, meaning that the United
States economic output was this much higher because of immi-
gration.29 Proponents of more immigration stressed the positive
economic benefits of immigrants; opponents emphasized that an
$8 trillion economy expanding by 3 percent grows by $240 billion
a year, or $10 billion in two weeks, meaning that the overall
gains from immigration were fairly low. 30
The new twist is the argument that developing countries
benefit by sending workers abroad. The press release accompany-
ing the World Bank's Global Economic Prospects ("GEP") report
for 2006 argued that more "managed migration programs, in-
cluding temporary work visas for low-skilled migrants in indus-
trial countries ... would contribute to significant reductions in
poverty in migrant sending countries, among the migrants them-
selves, their families and, as remittances increase, in the broader
community."31 The GCIM recommended that "States and the pri-
platform for information exchange and discussion on different aspects of mode 4 trade").
27 Some developing countries cite the dangers of a brain drain, and some have asked
for compensation from industrial countries that accept their nurses. Celia Dugger, Africa
Needs a Million More Health Care Workers, Report Says, NY Times A27 (Nov 26, 2004)
(noting the Joint Learning Initiative's call for the creation of an "education fund" to pay
for the education of tens of thousands of health workers). Some economists argue that the
brain drains can turn into brain gains. Consider Andrew Mountford, Can a Brain Drain
be Good for Growth in the Source Economy?, 52 J of Developmental Econ 287 (1997).
28 James Smith and Barry Edmonston, eds, The New Americans: Economic, Demo-
graphic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration 227, 230-35 (National Academy 1997) (dis-
cussing the impact of immigration on wages and consumer prices).
29 Id at 153.
30 See Steven A. Camarota, Immigration's Effects on Jobs and Wages 3, Center for
Immigration Studies (December 1999), available at <http://www.cis.org/articles/1999/
combinednrc.pdf> (last visited June 18, 2007).
31 World Bank, Migration Can Deliver Welfare Gains, Reduce Poverty, Says Global
Economic Prospects 2006, (Nov 16, 2005), available at <http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAITOPICS/EXTPOVERTYO,,contentMDK:20724214-menuPK:26437
47-pagePK:64020865-piPK:149114-theSitePK:336992,00.html> (last visited Apr 14,
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vate sector should consider the option of introducing carefully
designed temporary migration programs. '32
There are more guest workers and guest worker programs
than ever before and, if these recommendations are followed, we
can expect a new age of guest worker programs. Many govern-
ments, however, are wary of guest workers, since experience has
shown that there is nothing more permanent than temporary
workers. 33 Understanding why guest worker programs get larger
and last longer than anticipated is a prerequisite to designing
programs that can come closer to fulfilling the goal of adding
workers temporarily to the labor force but not adding settlers to
the population.
I. DISTORTION AND DEPENDENCE
Guest worker programs tend to get larger and to last longer
than anticipated because of distortion and dependence. Most em-
ployers in host countries do not hire guest workers. Distortion
means that those who do often assume migrants will continue to
be available, and some employers make investment decisions
that reflect this assumption. As a result, farmers may plant fruit
trees in areas with few people, assert that they will go out of
business without migrants to pick their crops, and resist efforts
to reduce the number of guest workers because such a reduction
would reduce the value of their investment. If governments
nonetheless reduce or end guest worker programs, illegal migra-
tion may rise as migrants seek available jobs formerly occupied
by guest workers.
Dependence reflects the fact that some migrants and their
families, as well as residents of their regions and countries of
origin, may assume that foreign jobs, earnings, and remittances
will continue to be available, and thus make investments such as
buying or building housing that reflect this assumption. If the
opportunity to work abroad is curbed, migrants may migrate il-
legally to avoid reductions in their incomes and a loss of assets.
2007).
32 Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an interconnected
world: New directions for action 79 (2005), available at <http://www.gcim.org/
attachements/gcim-complete-report-2005.pdf> (last visited Apr 10, 2007). The GEP cau-
tioned that foreign jobs and remittances "should not be viewed as a substitute for eco-
nomic development in the origin country as ultimately, development depends on sound
domestic economic policies."
33 Philip Martin, Manolo Abella and Christiane Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration
in the Twenty-First Century 125-29 (Yale 2006).
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Most researchers conclude that the 1942-64 Bracero programs
sowed the seeds of subsequent unauthorized Mexico-United
States migration via distortion in rural America and dependence
in rural Mexico. 34
Distortion and dependence should make governments cau-
tious about launching new guest worker programs to "get con-
trol" of illegal migration, and should make such programs a last,
rather than a first, resort. If guest worker programs are intro-
duced, they should include economic mechanisms to minimize
distortion and dependence, such as taxes to encourage employers
to look for alternatives to migrants and subsidies to encourage
guest workers to return to their countries of origin as their con-
tracts require.
Dealing with distortion requires recognition that employers
always have choices in making investments and filling jobs. By
the time the government gets involved, employers have usually
found the migrants they want to hire, so that undergoing the
usual supervised period of recruitment to seek local workers al-
most always fails to find any. Government employment services
are ill-suited to second-guess employers who find local workers
unqualified; if worker advocates sue, arguing that guest workers
are not needed or that local workers were passed over, the labor
certification process can become contentious.
Furthermore, once employers learn how to have their "need"
for guest workers certified, for example, by writing job descrip-
tions that will not produce many local applicants, most assume
they will continue to be able to hire foreign workers. As a result,
investments in alternatives to migrants wither, and distortions
increase as migrant-dependent sectors become isolated from na-
tional labor markets. Networks soon cross borders, and current
migrants refer friends and relatives to fill vacant jobs. As a re-
sult, labor market information may flow far more freely from a
34 Douglas S. Massey and Zai Liang, The long-term consequences of a temporary
worker program: The U.S. Bracero Experience, 8 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev 199, 200
(1989) (noting that the "Bracero Program was not temporary" because immigration is
"inherently dynamic and social" and that immigration "does not cease when labor re-
cruitment ends"); Elizabeth Fussell and Douglas S. Massey, The Limits to Cumulative
Causation: International Migration From Mexican Urban Areas, 41 Demography 151
(2004) (arguing that patterns of migration from urban areas are distinct from the more
commonly-studied rural area migrations of Mexico, namely in that the former do not
accord with the "principle mechanisms of cumulative causation," while the latter do). See
Consider Douglas S. Massey, et al, Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International
Migration from Western (California 1987).
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migrant workplace to the migrant's country of origin than to
pockets of unemployed workers nearby in the receiving country.
International norms and local laws call for migrant workers
to be treated equally, 35 with the same wages and benefits as local
workers. One way to minimize distortion is to realize that payroll
taxes for social security and unemployment and other insurance
add 20 to 40 percent to wages. 36 These taxes should be collected
on migrant wages to level the playing field between migrant and
local workers, but in most cases guest workers are not eligible for
the benefits financed by the taxes. If the employer share of pay-
roll taxes were used to combat distortion by supporting labor-
saving mechanization or restructuring jobs to reduce the need for
migrants over time, governments could restore or maintain em-
ployer interest in alternatives to migrants. For example, in an
industry such as agriculture, it is often hard for one farmer to
finance or implement mechanization, since peach packers and
processors want either hand or mechanically-picked fruit, but not
both, so a mechanization program funded by payroll taxes and
encouraged by government may be needed to help shape alterna-
tives to migrants.3 7
The other half of the equation is giving migrants incentives
to abide by the terms of their contracts, which usually require
departure when jobs end or a time limit is reached. Guest work-
ers can be given unique tax-reporting numbers, and the worker's
share of payroll taxes could be refunded when the migrant sur-
renders his or her work visa in the country of origin. Given the
global interest in using remittances to hasten development, as
reflected in the United Nations's High-Level Dialogue in Sep-
tember 2006, governments and development institutions could
35 See, for example, ILO Conventions 97, Article 6 ("[elach member... undertakes to
apply ... to immigrants lawfully within its territory, treatment no less favourable than
that which it applies to its own nationals" in respect to certain enumerated examples) and
143 (supplemental migrant labor protection provisions), available at <http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/english/convdispl.htm> (last visited Apr 15, 2007).
36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Benefits and Wages:
OECD Indicators (2004), available at <http://www.oecd.org/document28/0,2340,en_2649-
34633_34000860_1_1_1,00.html> (last visited Apr 15, 2007). See also Society at a
Glance: OECD Social Indicators 2006 Edition 61, table SS5 (OECD 2007).
37 Consider Philip Martin, Promise Unfulfilled: Unions, Immigration, and Farm
Workers § 8 (Cornell 2003). Mechanization is not the only option to reduce dependence on
migrants over time. In some cases, local workers may be attracted to "migrant jobs" after
they are restructured, as when a central agent or hiring hall deploys workers to fill sea-
sonal or part-time jobs more efficiently than the current decentralized system that relies
on labor contractors. To recognize that each sector is different, boards representing em-
ployers, workers, and government could decide how to spend the accumulated funds to
reduce dependence on guest workers over time. Id.
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match these payroll tax refunds to support projects that create
jobs in the migrants' home areas.38
Minimizing distortion and dependence with taxes and subsi-
dies will not yield the desired effects if unauthorized workers are
readily available and labor laws are not enforced. Some employ-
ers hire unauthorized workers to save payroll taxes, and mi-
grants established abroad will resist returning when their work
visas expire despite refunds if they perceive that more opportuni-
ties exist abroad. Thus, enforcement of other immigration and
labor laws is a prerequisite to guest worker programs that avoid
distortion and dependence.
II. AMERICAN AND GERMAN EXPERIENCES
Illegal migration was not a concern when the United States
and Germany began guest worker programs over a half century
ago. During the 1940s, United States government employees re-
cruited Mexicans to work in the United States, and during the
1960s, Germany's employment service established branches
abroad to recruit migrants to work in Germany. 39 Once migrant
networks were established, however, the flow of guest workers
took on a life of its own, demonstrating that it is far easier to
start than to stop labor migration.
In both the U.S. and Germany, the timing and nature of the
benefits and costs of guest workers favored importing workers.
38
Participants acknowledged that remittances were the most tangible benefit of
international migration for countries of origin. They noted that the volume of
remittances had increased markedly in recent years. While remittances bene-
fited millions of families of migrants, participants believed that their develop-
ment potential could be enhanced by appropriate measures. These encompassed
increasing competition among money-transfer companies and banks to reduce
transfer fees, improving the access to banking services, including credit, of mi-
grants and their families and expanding financial literacy in countries of origin.
There was consensus that remittances were private flows and should not be
considered a substitute for official development assistance, direct foreign in-
vestment or debt relief. Some participants warned about the potentially nega-
tive consequences of remittances, including the culture of dependency that they
might foster at both the household and national levels.
United Nations, Summary of the High Level Dialogue on International Migration & De-
velopment 3 (Oct 13, 2006).
39 Philip L. Martin, The United States: The Continuing Immigration Debate, in
Wayne A. Cornelius, et al, eds, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective 51, 58
(Stanford 2004); Philip L. Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First
Century in Cornelius, Controlling Immigration (discussing the Employment Service of-
fices, and describing migrant recruitment at the Istanbul office in particular).
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The benefits of guest worker programs are immediate and meas-
urable in economic terms in the sense that migrants arrive and
fill vacant jobs; these benefits are concentrated among employers
who hire them as well as among complementary workers and
some consumers. The costs of guest workers tend to be deferred,
harder to measure, and diffuse, such as when migrants unify
their families, settle, and introduce diversity, which some natives
may see as a cost and others as a benefit.
A. United States Braceros
The 35.7 million foreign-born residents in the United States
in 2004 were about 12 percent of residents.40 They included 31
percent naturalized U.S. citizens, 39 percent legal immigrants
and nonimmigrants such as foreign students and legal tempo-
rary workers, and 30 percent unauthorized foreigners. 41 The
stock of unauthorized foreigners rose by an estimated 4.4 million
between 2000 and 2005, by an average of 880,000 a year. 42 By
comparison, 706,000 legal immigrants were admitted in 2003.43
About 57 percent of unauthorized foreigners in the United
States were born in Mexico, as were 30 percent of the legal im-
migrants. 44 The roots of this large-scale Mexico-U.S. migration
were planted during Bracero ("strong arm") guest worker pro-
grams begun in war time, in 1917 and again in 1942. 45 Each of
these Bracero programs reached its peak in peacetime, in 1920
and 1956, before being terminated unilaterally by the United
States. 46 The Bracero program shows how distortion and depend-
ence can lead to subsequent illegal migration, and it also shows
the failure of U.S. farmers to predict what would happen without
Bracero workers.
40 Jeffrey S. Passel, Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented
Population 7 (Pew Hispanic Center 2005), available at <http:lpewhispanic.orglfiles
reports/44.pdf> (last visited Feb 6 2007).
41 Id.
42 Id at 2.
43 Department of Homeland Security, 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, avail-
able at <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/tableOl.xls> (last
visited June 18, 2003).
44 Passel, Estimates at 2 (cited in note 40).
45 Massey and Liang, Long Term Consequences 8 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 200
(noting that "several observers have argued that it ultimately encouraged a larger and
more permanent migration to the United States') (citations omitted) (cited in note 34).
46 Otey M. Scruggs, Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 1942 Vol 34,
No 3 Agricultural History 142 (1960).
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The second Bracero program began in 1942, just after John
Steinbeck's 1939 novel The Grapes of Wrath47 was published. The
book gave an emotional impetus to the call for reform of the farm
labor system, particularly in the southwestern states that de-
pended on armies of seasonal workers who had no other U.S. job
options because of discrimination (as with the Chinese) or lack of
language and skills (as with the Japanese, Okies, and Arkies).48
However, with crop losses possible in 1942, domestic opposition
to Mexican workers was overcome, and Braceros began to trickle
into the United States. Bracero admissions during WWII peaked
at 62,000 in 1944. 49 The United States had over four million
hired farm workers in 1944, making Braceros less than 2 percent
of U.S. farm workers. 50
During the 1942-47 Bracero program, the U.S. government
guaranteed contracts signed by migrants and farmers, a provi-
sion demanded by Mexico because of problems with nonpayment
of wages in the World War I program to workers who went
through the Mexican sources. 51 After 1947, farmers could con-
tract individually with Braceros. This change prompted wide-
spread illegal migration as Mexicans avoided paying bribes in
Mexico to get on recruitment lists and U.S. farmers avoided hav-
ing to pay the cost of transportation from the place of recruit-
ment to the place of work by hiring workers who showed up at
the worksite. 52
47 John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (Viking 1939).
48 Martin, Promise Unfulfilled at 43-46 (cited in note 37).
49 Id at 45.
50 Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 42, 31
(1980). In addition to Braceros, prisoners of war, interned Japanese, and state and local
prisoners "supplemented" the U.S. hired farm work force, sending an unmistakable sig-
nal: to get ahead in the U.S. labor market, ambitious young Americans had to get out of
farm work, which was relatively easy to do during World War II. Consider Martin, Prom-
ise Unfulfilled (cited in note 37).
51 See Rural Migration News, Braceros: History, Compensation, 12 Rural Migration
News 2 (Apr 2006), available at <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id =
1112_040> (last visited Feb 6, 2007). To ensure that Braceros had some savings from
their U.S. work, 10 percent of Bracero earnings between 1942 and 1947 were sent by
farmers to a U.S. bank and transferred to a Mexican bank. Id. These forced savings often
disappeared in Mexico, prompting suits four decades after the last Bracero entered the
U.S. for hundreds of millions of dollars. Id. The Mexican government in 2005 established
a $25 million fund to provide up to $3,500 to ex-Braceros and their relatives who regis-
tered with proof that they worked as Braceros. As of March 2006, some 250,000 people
had registered, suggesting up to $875 million in payouts. Id. See also Scruggs Evolution
at 147-48 (cited in note 46).
52 Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues at 31 (cited in note 50) (not-
ing the problem and recommending that "[n]o employer ... should be permitted to con-
tract directly with foreign workers for employment in the United States").
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The U.S. government encouraged illegal migration and em-
ployment by legalizing illegal Mexican farm workers found on
U.S. farms in a process that official U.S. government publica-
tions called "drying out the wetbacks. 53 This involved taking
unauthorized farm workers found inside the U.S. to the Mexico-
U.S. border, issuing them documents, and returning the now-
legal Braceros to the farm on which they were found. 54 There
were no penalties on farmers for knowingly hiring unauthorized
workers, and the number of "wetbacks" soon exceeded the num-
ber of legally admitted Braceros. 55 In 1949, for example, about
20,000 Mexicans received contracts from U.S. employers to cross
the border as guest workers, and over 87,000 arrived illegally in
the United States and had their status legalized. 56
Rising illegal migration had several consequences. A Presi-
dential Commission in 1951 recommended that the number of
Braceros be reduced over time, concluding that their presence
was adversely affecting U.S. farm workers 57; the Commission
also recommended that the U.S. government introduce sanctions
for employers who knowingly hire illegal workers, a recommen-
dation supported by President Truman and the Mexican gov-
ernment. However, United States farmers used the outbreak of
the Korean War in 1951 to persuade Congress 58 to instead ap-
prove a new Bracero program that had fewer employer obliga-
tions,59 while the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195260 in-




56 Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues at 31 (cited in note 50).
57 President's Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agri-
culture: Report of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor at 59 ("It is our conclu-
sion that the evidence demonstrates that the agencies of Government responsible for
importing and contracting foreign labor have not been successful in protecting domestic
farm labor from detrimental effects of imported contract alien labor. We find alien labor
has depressed farm wages and, therefore, has been detrimental to domestic labor.") (cited
in note 53).
58 Farmers used arguments that have a familiar ring. Americans did not want to fill
seasonal farm jobs because welfare benefits gave them better options, a new Bracero
program would benefit Mexico and reduce illegal migration, and as price-takers, farmers
were in no position to raise wages in order to try to attract U.S. workers. Consider Ellis
W. Hawley, The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue, 40 Agr Hist 157 (1966) (demonstrat-
ing how, "[i]n defiance of all logic, [farmers] have been able for long periods of time to
maintain special programs that benefit only a tiny segment of American agriculture").
59 An Act to Amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub L 82-78, 65 Stat 119 (1951).
60 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub L 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat 163, 229
(1952), codified at 8 USC § 1101 et seq, amended by Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, Pub L 99-603, § 112, 100 Stat 3359, 3381-82 (1986).
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cluded the Texas Proviso, which made harboring illegal aliens a
crime punishable by a fine of up to $2,000 and a prison term of
up to five years, but specifically excluded employing illegal work-
ers from the definition of harboring. 61
The Bracero program expanded in the 1950s, when federal
and state irrigation projects opened new land for farming in the
southwest,62 the cost of shipping produce by truck to the east
coast fell with the completion of the interstate highway system,
and the baby boom increased the demand for fruits and vegeta-
bles. Bracero admissions peaked at 445,197 in 1956, after "Op-
eration Wetback" removed over a million unauthorized foreigners
and the U.S. Department of Labor relaxed its enforcement of the
wage and housing regulations aimed at protecting Braceros.63
Western farmers assumed that Braceros would continue to be
available, and made business decisions reflecting this assump-
tion, including planting more acres of fruits and vegetables. 64
The result was a sharp rise in land prices in California, as the
state replaced New Jersey as the U.S. garden state.65
During the late 1950s, in response to union and church com-
plaints of ill-treatment of Braceros and adverse effects of
Braceros on U.S. workers, 66 the U.S. Department of Labor
("DOL") began to more aggressively enforce labor laws.67 DOL
reports documented the fact that Braceros had been used ille-
gally to undermine strikes called by U.S. workers.68 President
Kennedy agreed with critics that Braceros were adversely affect-
61 8 USC § 1324(a) (1982) (This provision was subsequently amended and no longer
includes the employment exception.).
62 Alan L. Olmstead and Paul W. Rhode, The Evolution of California Agriculture,
1850-2000, in Jerry Siebert, ed, California Agriculture: Dimensions and Issues 16-17
(Giannini Foundation), available at <http://giannini.ucop.edu/CalAgbook.htm> (last vis-
ited July 22, 2007).
63 Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues at 35 (cited in note 50).
64 See generally Alan L. Olmstead and Paul W. Rhode, The Evolution of California
Agriculture, 1850-2000 and Warren E. Johnston, Cross Sections of a Diverse Agriculture:
Profiles of California's Agricultural Production Regions and Principal Commodities, in
Jerry Siebert, Ed., California Agriculture (cited in note 62).
65 Id.
66 See Ellis W. Hawley, The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue at 172 (cited in note
58).
67 Id.
68 See United States Department of Labor, Mexican Farm Labor Program, Consult-
ants Report 272 (1959), reprinted in Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program: Hear-
ings on S. 1466, S. 1945, and H.R. 2010 before a Subcommittee on Agriculture and For-
estry, 87th Cong, 1st Sess, 272 (1961) ("Knowledge of the availability of Mexican nationals
weakens the domestic workers' bargaining position and contributes to the depression of
area wage levels.").
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ing United States Hispanics and proposed that the program be
ended in 1963.69 This set the stage for often emotional hearings
on Braceros during the summer of 1963, with witnesses arguing
that Bracero workers were necessary to keep fruit and vegetable
prices "reasonable" and to help the U.S. maintain "food security"
during the Cold War.70
The Bracero program was nonetheless terminated, and pre-
dictions of what would happen without Braceros proved to be
false. The processing tomato crop figured prominently in the de-
bates over whether to continue the Bracero program, since 86
percent of the 44,000 peak harvest workers employed to pick the
2.2 million ton processing tomato crop in California were
Braceros. 71 Contrary to expectations, the harvest was mecha-
nized rapidly in the mid-1960s, as plant scientists and engineers
collaborated to develop tomatoes that ripened simultaneously
and a machine was developed to cut and shake ripe tomatoes
from the plants. 72 Within a decade after the Bracero program
ended, fewer than 8000 workers rode machines to sort far more
than twice as many tomatoes than were picked by Bracero and
American farmworkers. 73
Mexico-U.S. migration was relatively low between the end of
the Bracero program and peso devaluations in the late 1970s,
producing a "golden age" for U.S. farm workers. Cesar Chavez
and the United Farm Workers ("UFW') won a 40 percent wage
increase for grape pickers in 1966, increasing entry-level wages
from $1.25 to $1.75 an hour plus 25 cents a box at a time when
the federal minimum wage was $1.25, in part because Bracero
replacement workers were not available. 74 The grape boycott put
Chavez on the cover of Time in 1969, when most large California
fruit and vegetable growers had contracts with unions or offered
union-like wages and benefits. 75 By 1975, California farm worker
unions were strong enough to persuade the Legislature to enact
the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, considered even more fa-
69 Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues at 52-53 (cited in note 50).
70 See Hawley, The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue at 174-76 (cited in note 58).
71 Philip L. Martin and Alan L. Olmstead, The Agricultural Mechanization Contro-
versy, 227 Sci 4687, 601 (Feb 1985).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Martin, Promise Unfulfilled at 67-68 (cited in note 37).
75 Time (July 4, 1969), available at <http://www.time.comltime/covers/0,16641,
19690704,00.html> (last visited Feb 9, 2007).
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vorable to workers and unions than the National Labor Relations
Act. 76
The golden era for farm workers came to an end in the early
1980s. During a period of high inflation in 1979, when the fed-
eral minimum wage was $3.35, the UFW called strikes in sup-
port of another 40 percent wage increase, in a bid to raise the
entry-level wages on farms with union contracts from $3.75 to
$5.25 an hour. 77 Mexico had just discovered oil, and the Mexican
government went on a spending spree that discouraged emigra-
tion. Many multinationals that bought farm land as an inflation
hedge in the 1970s, and had brand names vulnerable to boycotts,
reluctantly agreed to raise wages. 78 However, the Mexican econ-
omy and peso crashed in 1982 and labor contractors hiring unau-
thorized Mexicans soon replaced unionized farm workers. The
UFW claimed 70,000 members in the early 1970s, but had fewer
than 7,000 a decade later as unionized farms went out of busi-
ness.
79
The distortion due to Braceros was evident in the expansion
of labor-intensive agriculture in California, far from the consum-
ers of the fruits and vegetables produced. When the influx of
Braceros ended in the mid-1960s, there was widespread mecha-
nization, belying assertions that, if labor-saving machines could
have been used when Braceros were available, they would have
been. Dependence was evident in Mexico, where the government
neglected rural areas, driving workers to emigrate to the United
States. After the Bracero program ended, Mexico and the United
States agreed to make exceptions to their trade laws to allow
76 Alatorre-Senovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, Cal
Labor Code §§ 1140-1166.3. Farm workers remain excluded from the federal National
Labor Relations Act, which grants union rights to most private sector workers. See 29
USC §§ 151-69.
77 These negotiations are described in Martin, Promise Unfulfilled at 74-75 (cited in
note 37). Consider Philip L. Martin, Imperial Valley: Agriculture and Farm Labor (un-
published manuscript), available at <http://migration.ucdavis.edulcf/more.php?id=
34_0_2_0> (last visited Apr 15, 2007).
78 See, for example, Sun-Harvest, the vegetable division of what is now Chiquita that
went out of business in the early 1980s. Martin, Promise Unfulfilled at 74-75 (cited in
note 37).
79 LM-2 reports filed with the U.S. Department of Labor, available at <http://union-
reports.dol.gov/olmsWeb/docs/index.html> (last visited Apr 15, 2007).
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maquiladora assembly plants80 to create jobs for ex-Braceros who
had moved there from the interior to be closer to their U.S. jobs.81
B. German Gastarbeiter
Germany's guest worker program also began with agricul-
ture, when a 1955 agreement allowed German farmers to hire
Italian migrant workers.8 2 The growing demand for labor during
the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) years, however,
turned out to be in German factories, and construction sites.8 3 By
the early 1960s employers in these sectors received permission to
hire migrants under bilateral agreements signed with seven non-
European Community "recruitment countries": Greece, Morocco,
Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.8 4
There was no significant discussion of alternatives to re-
cruiting guest workers for four major reasons. First, the German
labor force was shrinking for demographic and social reasons,
including a delayed baby boom that seemed to limit female labor
force participation, expanded educational opportunities that kept
more youth in school, and better pensions that prompted earlier
retirements. Second, there was a reluctance to risk what was
perceived to be a fragile postwar economic recovery by encourag-
ing alternatives to foreign workers, such as allowing wages to
rise to encourage labor-saving mechanization.8 5 Unions did not
oppose importing foreign workers after they secured a promise
that Germans would be hired first and guest workers would re-
ceive equal wages and benefits.8 6
80 Maquiladoras are foreign-owned plants in Mexico that import components, assem-
ble them into televisions, and re-export the finished goods. See Aureliano Gonzalez Baz,
Manufacturing in Mexico, available at <http://www.udel.eduleipzig/texts2/vox128.htm>
(last visited July 22, 2007).
81 See Tony M. Ramirez, The Maquiladora Industry: A Brief History, available at
<http://www.madeinmexicoinc.com/maquiladora-overview.htm> (last visited Apr 15,
2007).
82 Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the 21st Century at 225 (cited in note
39).
83 Id.
84 Id. Greece became a member of the European Community ("EC") in 1981, and
Spain and Portugal became members in 1986. Greeks had to wait seven years, until 1988,
for full freedom of movement rights. Spain and Portugal, scheduled to have freedom of
movement rights after seven years, in 1993, got mobility rights one year early in 1992.
85 Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century at 225-26
(cited in note 39). See generally, Charles Kindleberger, Europe's Postwar Growth: The
Role of Labor Supply (Harvard 1967).
86 Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century at 225-26
(cited in note 39).
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Third, unifying Europe was based on freedom of movement,
meaning that after January 1, 1968, a European Economic
Community/European Union ("EEC/EU") worker could leave his
country, enter another EEC/EU country for up to three months
in search of a job and, if he found a job, the host country was
obliged to issue any needed work and residence permits.8 7 Re-
cruiting guest workers was thus encouraging a labor migration
that would soon occur in any event. Fourth, Germany and other
European nations had undervalued currencies in a world of fixed
exchange rates during the 1960s, which made Europe a center
for investment. 88 With $1 buying 5DM when it "should have"
bought 4DM, local and American capital was invested to build
and expand factories to produce goods for domestic and export
markets.8 9 An undervalued exchange rate, combined with the
flexibility of American multinationals, led a French writer to
warn of The American Challenge90 to Europe via United States
investments.
The number of guest workers in Germany grew rapidly in
the early 1960s.91 After a recession-induced dip in 1966-67, the
number of guest workers climbed to a peak 2.6 million in 1973,
when migrants were 12 percent of Germany's employed wage
and salary workers. 92 When first recruited, migrants received
one-year work and residence permits.93 These could be renewed
for two years, and a first renewal brought the right to have fam-
ily members join the migrant. 94 The next two-year renewal gave
migrants permanent residence or immigrant rights, as foreigners
with at least five years in Germany could not be removed if they
lost their jobs or drew unemployment or welfare benefits. 95
87 W.R. Bohning, The Migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European
Community 15 (Oxford 1972).
88 Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century at 225 (cited in
note 39).
89 Id.
90 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge xiii (Atheneum 1968)
("Starting with a rather matter-of-fact examination of American investment in Europe,
we find an economic system that is in a state of collapse. It is our own. We see a foreign
challenger breaking down the political and psychological framework of our societies. We
are witnessing the prelude to our own historical bankruptcy.").
91 See Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the 21st Century at 226-27 (cited in
note 39).
92 Id at 224.
93 Id at 227.
94 See id at 228.
95 Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century at 226-28
(cited in note 39).
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The government and most Germans expected employers to
send migrants home after a year on the assembly line or at the
construction site, while sending-country governments assumed
that migrants would be eager to return to their families with
savings from their German jobs.96 The jobs filled by migrants
were year-round, however, and employers were reluctant to send
home trained migrants and take their chances with new re-
cruits. 97 Many migrants, on the other hand, soon preferred to
take six-week vacations rather than give up jobs that paid wages
five or six times higher than those at home and offered benefits
as well. 98 Many employers wanted their migrant employees to
stay longer,99 so many did.
Even though many employers were becoming structurally
dependent on migrants who were achieving immigrant status in
"non-immigrant Germany," researchers reinforced the position of
the government that Germany was not a country of immigration.
Their surveys found that most Turks and Yugoslavs planned to
return eventually, citing the cold weather, high cost of living,
and lack of integration. 100 The expectation that migrants would
return, and the desire of many migrants to return, obviated inte-
gration policies. Instead, there were diverse state and local gov-
ernment efforts to deal with the migrant children who were as-
sumed to be in Germany only temporarily. Some schools provided
native-language instruction to make re-integration easier at
home, while others offered German-language instruction in regu-
lar German classrooms.101
By the early 1970s, economists were beginning to warn of
distortion, especially on the assembly lines staffed by migrants.
They noted that Japanese auto manufacturers, whose requests
for guest workers had been rejected, took the lead in developing
assembly-line robots, while German manufacturers recruited
more migrants. Meanwhile, the "fortune in small change" sent to
the migrants' areas of origin did more to improve housing and
spread a desire for imported consumer goods than to foster stay-
96 Id at 228-30.
97 Id at 228-29.
98 Id.
99 Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century at 229 (cited in
note 39).
100 Ursula Mehrlinder, Aiuslanderforschung 1965 bis 1980: Fragestellungen, theore-
tische Ansdtze, empirische Ergebnisse, (Neue Gesellschaft Bonn 1987).




at-home development. The queues of Turks registered to go
abroad reached over a million by 1973.102
There were warnings that labor migration to Germany
risked getting "out of control," 10 3 a sense reinforced by wildcat
strikes involving migrants in the summer of 1973.104 After the oil
embargo threatened a recession and higher unemployment, the
German government stopped the recruitment of non-EC, un-
skilled workers on November 23, 1973, and this recruitment stop
remains in place today.10 5 However, migrants who had been in
Germany at least a year before they lost their jobs were eligible
for unemployment benefits. Most realized that, if they left Ger-
many, they would be unable to return.
With oil-induced recessions at home and abroad, most guest
workers decided to settle in Germany and form or unite families.
The result is clear in Figure 1. In 1973, two-thirds of the four
million foreigners in Germany were employed; by 2000, only a
quarter of the seven million foreigners in Germany were em-
ployed.
102 Philip L. Martin, The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western
Europe, with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany 105 (Geneva 1991).
103 Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the 21st Century at 229 (cited in note
39).
104 Id.
105 Id. Anwerbestopp is the German term for recruitment stop.
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Figure 1
Foreign Residents and Employed Foreigners in Germany,
1960-2000
III. CONTEMPORARY PROGRAMS
During the U.S. Bracero and German guest worker eras,
there was one major program for admitting migrant workers.
Today, the United States, Germany, and most other high-income
countries have multiple programs to admit foreign workers via
"front," "side," and "back doors." Their dominant and recurring
theme is straightforward: welcome skilled workers to settle and
aim to rotate unskilled in and out of the country.
Front doors are for foreigners invited to settle. Most front-
door immigrants arrive to join settled family members, and a
smaller number are resettled because they face persecution at
home. 106 Industrial countries also permit highly skilled or eco-
nomic migrants to enter and settle with their families, with Aus-
tralia, Canada, and the United Kingdom selecting economic mi-
grants on a supply-side basis of personal characteristics such as
age and education, and Germany and the United States selecting
106 For U.S. data, see Philip L. Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, Immigration: Shaping
and Reshaping America, 52 Population Reference Bureau 5 (2003) (showing that refugees
formed just slightly more than 10% of documented immigrants in the United States).
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economic migrants on a demand-side basis of having a job of-
fer. 10 7 There has been convergence between points-based or sup-
ply-side selection systems and employer-based or demand-side
selection systems, as Canada awards points to foreigners with
job offers and the U.S. makes it easiest to get immigrant visas for
college-educated foreigners.108
Side-door migrants are admitted for a specific time and pur-
pose that ranges from a few days for tourism to several years for
work or study. Side doors were traditionally not linked explicitly
to front-door settlement channels, as reflected in rules requiring
foreign students to return to their country of origin upon gradua-
tion. This has changed, and most industrial countries now allow
foreign student graduates to work after graduation and then set-
tle, just as foreign professionals can enter as guest workers and
later settle as immigrants. 0 9 Back-door migrants refers to for-
eigners who enter a country illegally as well as those who enter
legally and violate the terms of their entry, as when a tourist
goes to work. In the United States and southern European coun-
tries such as Italy and Spain, many of the foreigners who even-
tually wind up as immigrants arrive in illegal or quasi-legal
status. 110
The major change between past and current guest worker
programs is in their scope and purpose. The older programs were
macro in the sense that there was one major program per coun-
107 See Martin, Germany: Managing Migration in the 21st Century at 222 (cited in
note 39). In both Germany and the U.S., most immigrants admitted for economic reasons
are selected by employers as the best candidates to fill vacant jobs if local workers are
unavailable. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration Through Em-
ployment, available at <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscislmenuitem.5af9bb95919f35e
66f614176543f6d1a?vgnextoid=84096138f898dOl0VgnVCM10000048f3d6alRCRD&vgne
xtchannel=4f7l9c7755cb90loVgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD> (last visited July 22,
2007).
108 For an explanation of the Canadian system, see Citizenship and Immigration Can-
ada, Immigrating to Canada, available at <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigratel
index.html> (last visited Apr 15, 2007). For an explanation of the US system, see United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Lawful Permanent Residence ("Green
Card"), available at <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89
243c6a7543f6dla1?vgnextoid=4f7l9c7755cb9OlOVgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD&vgnextc
hannel=4f79c7755cb90lOVgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD> (last visited Apr 15, 2007).
109 See, for example, Philip L. Martin, Manolo Abella and Christiane Kuptsch, Manag-
ing Labor Migration in the Twenty-First Century § 3 (Yale 2006).
110 The share of immigrants admitted to the U.S. who were in the U.S. and adjusted
status when their green cards became available rose from 52 percent in 2000 to 66 per-
cent in 2005. United States Department of Homeland Security, Table 6: Legal Permanent
Resident Flow by Type and Major Class of Admission: Fiscal Years 1996 to 2005, avail-
able at <http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/LPR05.shtm> (last visited Apr
15, 2007).
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try, and the overall unemployment and job vacancy rate played
determinative roles in decisions on the need for guest workers.
Today's programs are micro, aiming to fill job vacancies for
nurses, IT specialists, or farm workers111 ; overall unemployment
and job vacancy rates play little role in discussions about
whether these particular types of workers are needed. Govern-
ment employment services agencies, which have shrunk, have
less authority to deny employer requests for migrants, and less
credibility in finding local workers to fill job vacancies. 112
Germany has gone from having one guest worker program to
at least five today. The 1991 Aliens Act created new programs for
non-EU seasonal workers, project-tied workers, trainees, border
commuters, and nurses, each with different admissions criteria,
wages, rights in Germany, and return arrangements. 113 The new
micro programs involve fewer foreign workers, but they also in-
clude conditions that make it hard for migrants to settle. For ex-
ample, seasonal workers can stay a maximum eighty-nine days
in Germany, while project-tied workers are considered employees
in their country of origin, not in Germany, so their legal work
and residence does not count toward the five years to immigrant
status requirement.114
With contemporary guest worker programs admitting mi-
grants at the top and bottom of the job ladder, and admissions
procedures giving employers more authority to determine
whether foreign workers are needed, employers have gained an
important voice in admissions policy. In most industrial coun-
11 See the United States Department of Labor, Employment and Administration's
website for the different requirements for employers under various programs, available at
<http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/> (last visited Apr 15, 2007).
112 For the limits on what DOL can do with employer attestations for H-1B workers,
see The United States Governmental Accountability Office, H-1B Visa Program: More
Oversight by Labor Can Improve Compliance with Program Requirements GAO-06-901T
June 22, 2006, available at <www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?rptno=GAO-06-901T&
accno=A55841> (visited Apr 15, 2007). In the U.S., there are two major ways of determin-
ing whether an employer "needs" migrants. Under certification, the US Department of
Labor controls the border gate, not allowing migrants to enter until the employer con-
ducts recruitment activities supervised by DOL. Under the alternative attestation proc-
ess, the employer controls the border gate, opening it by attesting that she is paying the
prevailing wage, and DOL responds to complaints of violations. Both are explained on the
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Administration website (cited in note 111).
113 Act concerning the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Federal
Republic, (1991), unofficial English translation available at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
birntexis/vtx/rsdlrsddocview.htm?tbl=RSDLEGAL&id=3ae6b55aO> (last visited Feb 10,
2007). Consider Martin, The Continuing Immigration Debate (cited in note 39)




tries, if an employer decides that a college-educated foreigner is
the best person to fill a vacant job, the hiring and admission pro-
cedure is relatively straightforward. For example, H-1B visas in
the U.S. are generally gone early in the fiscal year in part be-
cause most employers simply "attest" that they are paying at
least the prevailing wage to a college-educated foreigner who is
to fill a job normally requiring a college education; there are
typically no investigations of employer assertions unless the gov-
ernment receives complaints. 115
IV. NUMBERS VERSUS RIGHTS
As the world enters a new age of guest worker programs,
there is little discussion of the difficult trade-off between the
competing goods of migrant numbers and rights. The demand for
migrant workers depends in part on their cost, which in turn de-
pends in part on their rights. If migrants have the "full rights"
laid out in International Labor Organization ("ILO") and United
Nations ("UN") conventions, including the right to work-related
benefits and family unification, their cost is typically higher and
fewer are demanded by employers. 116 On the other hand, fewer
rights and lower costs can expand migrant numbers, but lead to
a labor force in which different types of workers have different
rights and costs to employers.
Most international discussions call for more numbers and
rights; that is, more channels for legal guest workers to enter
rich countries as well as full ILO and UN rights for migrants.
Most countries receiving migrants have not ratified the ILO and
UN migrant conventions," 7 so in practice, this call for "more"
migrant protections provides little guidance to deal with the
trade-off in countries that do not ratify. For example, should
guest workers be encouraged or discouraged in Gulf oil exporters
that sharply restrict the rights of migrants? Migrants will likely
earn more in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait than they would at home,
115 United States Governmental Accountability Office, H-1B Visa Program: More
Oversight by Labor Can Improve Compliance with Program Requirements GAO-06-901T
June 22, 2006, 1, available at <www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?rptno=GAO-06-
901T&accno=A55841> (last visited Apr 15, 2007).
116 See Michael Hasenau, ILO Standards on Migrant Workers: The Fundamentals of
the UN Convention and Their Genesis, 25 Intl Migration 687, 688 (1991).
117 Ryszard Cholewinski notes that the ILO will not accept ratifications of its conven-
tions with national reservations. See Migrant Workers in International Human Rights
Law: Their Protection in Countries of Employment 91 (Clarendon Press 1997) ("[N]o res-
ervations may be made to [the ILO] Conventions.").
289]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
but there is no immediate prospect for equality between mi-
grants and natives.
The presence of migrants in countries that restrict their
rights demonstrates that many workers are willing to accept the
trade-off of higher wages for fewer rights. The fact that many
people pay large percentages of what they will earn to recruiters
to obtain contracts to work abroad suggests that the interna-
tional community may want to consider core migrant rights as
well as more comprehensive migrant rights conventions. 118
The fundamental dilemma is that inequality motivates mi-
gration, but migrant conventions and norms call for equality af-
ter arrival. This dilemma lies at the core of the World Trade Or-
ganization's ('WTO") General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS") negotiations, which aim to liberalize the movement of
"service providers" which, if achieved, could lead to "hundreds of
millions" of additional migrants. 119 Services move over borders in
four major modes. Mode one, cross-border supply occurs when
the service rather than the supplier or consumer crosses national
borders, as with call centers. 120 Mode two, consumption abroad
occurs when the consumer travels to the supplier, as when a
tourist visits another country or a patient travels abroad for
medical services. 121 Mode three, commercial presence reflects the
movement of capital, as when a bank or insurance company es-
tablishes a subsidiary in another country. And Mode four,
"movement of natural persons" involves the provider of a service
traveling to the consumer. 22
In 2004, less than 1.5 percent of global trade in services in-
volved Mode four. 23 Many developing countries would like to see
more Mode four movements, with India leading a group of coun-
tries demanding, among other things, changes in industrial
118 Consider Christiane Kuptsch, ed, Merchants of Labour (ILO 2006).
119 In answer to the question, "Are we looking at tens of millions of people moving
around in the future [under Mode four]," Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh, director of trade in
services at the World Trade Organization ("VTO"), said "Ah, yes-it could be hundreds [of
millions] if we liberalize." John Zarocostas, Migration helps export services, Washington
Times A10 (Jan 3, 2005).
120 See the explanation of the four modes at World Trade Organization, The General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): objectives, coverage and disciplines, available at
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-eserv-e/serve/gatsqa.e.htm> (visited Apr 15, 2007).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Oonagh Sands, Temporary Movement of Labor Fuels GATS Debate, available at
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=231> (last visited July 22,
2007) (citing a 2003 study by L. Alan Winters, Terrie L. Walmsley, Zhen Kun Wang, and
Roman Grynberg at the University of Sussex).
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country policies that would open more doors for their nationals
seeking to provide services. 124 The goal is a "GATS visa" that
would allow nationals of member countries access to any other
WTO member country; 125 refusal to allow entry and employment
would be a reason to file a complaint with the WTO.
The numbers versus rights trade-off becomes clear when
dealing with minimum wages for GATS service providers. ILO
Conventions 97 and 143 call for wage parity between migrant
and local workers. 126 Sumanta Chaudhuri and co-authors, how-
ever, assert that equal wages would limit numbers: "Wage-parity
... is intended to provide a nondiscriminatory environment,
[but] tends to erode the cost advantage of hiring foreigners and
works like a de facto quota."' 27 Rupa Chanda goes further, as-
serting that wage parity requirements act to "negate the cost-
based advantage of many developing countries in exporting la-
bour-intensive services and works against the very concept of
comparative advantage based on cost differentials."'128 In other
words, if GATS opened new channels for migrants, would they be
paid local minimum wages, which may limit their numbers, or
124 Sumanta Chaudhuri, Aaditya Matto, and Richard Self, Moving People to Deliver
Services: How Can the WTO help?, 38 J World Trade 363 (2004); Benny Kuruvillia, Ser-
vices Industry Drives India GATS Negotiations, Focus on the Global South (June 30,
2006), available at <http://www.focusweb.org/services-industry-drives-india-gats-
negotiations.html?Itemid=92> (last visited June 21, 2007).
125 Rupa Chanda, Movement of Natural Persons and the GATS, 24 World Economy
631-54, 648 (2001). See also National Foreign Trade Council, The Doha Development
Agenda and GATS Mode 4: Recommendations for Improved Rules on Temporary Global
Mobility 5 (2005), available at <http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/posp46nftc_
e.pdf> (last visited June 21, 2007).
126 ILO Convention 97, Migration for Employment Convention (1949), available at
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C097> (last visited Feb 11, 2007); ILO Con-
vention 134, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention Art 10 (1975),
available at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm> (last visited Feb 11, 2007):
Each Member for which the Convention is in force undertakes to declare and
pursue a national policy designed to promote and to guarantee, by methods ap-
propriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and
treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of social security, of trade
union and cultural rights and of individual and collective freedoms for persons
who as migrant workers or as members of their families are lawfully within its
territory.
Id.
127 Chaudhuri, Matto, and Self, Moving People to Deliver Services: How can the WTO
help? at 365-66 (cited in note 124).
128 Rupa Chanda, Movement and Presence of Natural Person and Developing Coun-
tries: Issues and Proposals for the GATS Negotiations, 29 S Centre Working Paper 9-10
(South Centre 2004).
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could they work for lower-than-minimum wages, which would
presumably increase numbers?
Numbers versus rights raises other questions as well. Mar-
tin Ruhs emphasizes that "[i]t is a human right to leave one's
country, but there is no corresponding right to enter another
country."129 As a result, the balance of power in determining
whether numbers or rights gets higher priority lies mostly in the
richer migrant-receiving countries, which have to answer ques-
tions such as whether to enforce the return of skilled migrants to
avoid brain drain from sending countries or welcome them to
generate the maximum benefits from immigration. Sending
countries largely react to these policies, making decisions about
whether to facilitate labor emigration or attempt to ban migra-
tion to particular countries.
CONCLUSIONS
Guest worker programs move workers from one country to
another. Economic theory suggests that workers moving from
lower to higher wage countries are the major beneficiaries of
such programs, but they increase global economic efficiency,
making labor migration a "natural component" of globalization
that integrates markets.
Governments with large numbers of unauthorized foreign
workers often see guest worker programs as the best compromise
between the extremes of no borders and no migrants. The argu-
ments for having legal guest workers rather than unauthorized
foreigners seem compelling. Employers argue they cannot find
local workers to fill vacant jobs at prevailing wages and working
conditions, and many migrants want to work abroad for higher
wages. With worries about integrating second- and third-
generation foreigners, governments find much appeal in "borrow-
ing" workers from lower-wage countries.
The new era of guest worker programs can anticipate and
deal with the distortion and dependence that caused earlier pro-
grams to end under a cloud. Recognizing that economic incen-
tives can reinforce program rules and including these incentives
in twenty-first-century guest worker programs can help ensure
that guest workers do not become permanent features of the
landscape in sending and receiving countries.
129 Martin Ruhs, Designing Viable and Ethical Labor Immigration Policies, World
Migration 209 (Intl Org for Migration 2005).
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Well-managed guest worker programs benefit migrants and
receiving countries, but it is less clear that sending countries
benefit from recruitment, remittances, and returns. The ILO re-
viewed the migration and development literature and concluded
that "migration can contribute positively to development where a
country is already poised to develop; it cannot, however, create
such a condition."'13 0 The World Bank similarly asserts that "mi-
gration should not be viewed as a substitute for economic devel-
opment in the origin country-development ultimately depends on
sound domestic economic policies." 131
There are several conflicts of interest between receivers and
senders. Receiving countries prefer the best and brightest work-
ers, such as IT and health care professionals, not the unem-
ployed and unskilled. The professionals earn more and can remit
more, but may also find it easier to settle abroad, which likely
reduces remittances. It is not yet clear whether the advice being
given to developing countries-don't worry if your best and
brightest leave because you will get remittances-will eventually
be as discredited as the advice of a half-century ago from inter-
national development institutions to speed up development by
creating and protecting basic steel and other industries from in-
ternational trade.132
The governments and international institutions advocating
more guest worker programs have not dealt with the fundamen-
tal dilemma that inequality motivates people to move, but most
norms call for equal treatment after arrival. Countries in which
the equality norm is ignored have the most migrants, as in the
Middle East, while countries that adhere to the equality norm
have fewer, as in Scandinavia. There are no easy or universal
answers as to whether numbers or rights should get higher prior-
ity, but one way forward is to think in terms of core rights that
all migrants should enjoy.
130 International Labor Office, Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global
Economy, International Labour Conference, 92nd Session, Report VI, available at <http:/l
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc92/pdf/rep-vi.pdf> (last visited June 21,
2007).
131 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects at xi (cited in note 31).
132 For reviews of these policies, see Sandra Blanco, The 1960s and 1970s: The World
Bank Attacks Poverty; Developing Countries Attack the IMF, available at <http:ll
www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/partl-IV.shtml> (last visited June 21, 2007)
(World Bank lending created the infrastructure for import-substitution manufacturing).
See also Felipe Pazos, Have Import Substitution Policies Either Precipitated or Aggra-
vated the Debt Crisis? 27 No 4 Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 57-73
(Winter 1985-1986) (Latin American countries thought they could create jobs for ex-
farmers only by industrializing).
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